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ABSTRACT
Among the many immigrant groups that have settled in the Netherlands, the
recently arrived migrants from Ghana have been perceived by the Dutch state as
especially problematic. Explicit measures have been taken to investigate marriages
of Ghanaians, as these appeared to be an avenue by which many acquired access
to the Dutch welfare state. While the Dutch government tightened its immigra-
tion policies, many Ghanaian Pentecostal churches were emerging in the Ghanaian
immigrant communities. An important function of these churches is to officiate
over marriages; marriages that are perceived as lawful and righteous in the eyes
of the migrant community but nonetheless do not have any legal basis as far as
the Dutch state is concerned. This contribution explores why the Ghanaian com-
munity attributes great moral significance to these marriages that are taking place
within their Pentecostal churches. It investigates the changing meaning of the func-
tions of Pentecostal churches in Ghana and in the Netherlands by distinguishing
civil morality from civic responsibility. It seeks to explore how, in both contexts,
legitimacy is created as well as contested in the face of prevailing state-civil soci-
ety relations. Through this exploration, it will become clear why, in both situa-
tions, Pentecostalism is unlikely to develop into a civic religion in the full sense
of the term.
Introduction
There is a growing body of literature in North Atlantic academia
that explores the importance of religion for immigrant groups in west-
ern states (Vertovec 1996, 1998, 2000, Sanneh 1993, Werbner 1997,
2002, 2004). Based on an older literature that studied processes of inte-
gration in 1960s American society and concluded that immigrants tend
to privilege their religion in the public domain, this recent corpus of
studies again underscores the dialectic of the public versus the private.
While western states commonly acknowledge religion in terms of the
private identity it offers to their citizens, immigrants are seen to enjoy
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2004 Journal of Religion in Africa, 34.4
Also available on line – www.brill.nl
JRA 606_438-467  11/18/04  1:26 PM  Page 438
Morality and Legitimacy in the Ghanaian Pentecostal Diaspora 439
the group membership that religion offers as a way of promoting self-
awareness in the public domain and as a way of negotiating processes
of integration and assimilation. Immigrant religion is thought to be
Janus-faced in the sense of acting on the one hand as a bastion against
state projects of nationhood, while simultaneously promoting a positive
image of the migrant community’s moral standing in the host society.
By emphasizing the uprootedness of migrants in alienating situations,
some authors propound normative views of the ways in which religion
caters to the needs of immigrants in such situations (Sanneh 1993, Ter
Haar 1998). Habermas for instance writes:
In an age of secularization and scienticization religion remains a major factor in
the moral education and motivation of individuals uprooted from other tradi-
tions . . . In an age of accelerating homogenization and simultaneous manufactur-
ing of difference . . . religions are articulated as the last refuge of unadulterated
difference, the last reservoir of cultural autonomy. (Habermas 2002: 1)
Yet, this normative function of religion being the last resort, the bul-
wark against assimilation and loss of identity, may create tensions and
suspicions on the side of the host societies’ power structures: anxieties
that may concern the degree of loyalty of immigrant religion towards
the nation-state and the nature of the civic responsibilities and civil
morality these groups proclaim. While the civil virtues these religious
groups put forward may be well respected in the host society, the polit-
ical function of these organizations in terms of the civic power they
may wield over their followers usually turns into a bone of contention.
This debate on the relationship between civil morality and civic legit-
imacy has emerged from Robert Bellah’s writings on the status of civic
religion in the United States, but has become particularly relevant in
the study of state-civil society relations. In processes of state formation,
civil society organizations have come to represent forms of interaction
and contestation—generated by actors and institutions—that share and
negotiate certain interests within the context of the social and political
economy. The term civil society therefore refers to labour unionism,
political activism, social movements, journalism but certainly also the
activities of religious organizations as they too are generally perceived
to be in a position to give voice to certain group interests in the con-
text of the nation-state. Two dominant lines of enquiry have evolved.
One investigates the functioning of civil society in terms of the con-
tentious politics social movements generally are involved in and how
these movements ‘frame’ the activities and motivations of their mem-
bers (see Tarrow 1998, Meyer and Tarrow 1998, McAdam, Tarrow
and Tilly 2001). Of crucial importance is the question to what extent
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these movements are able to generate civic legitimacy for their actions
(the right to strike, for example) in the civil milieu and the extent to
which this legitimacy is questioned, if not denied (see for instance
Kopecky and Mudde 2003 on the ‘uncivil society’ in post-communist
Europe). The other line of enquiry focuses on the civil morality of non-
state actors and institutions and specifically explores the generation of
social capital in contemporary societies (see Rotberg 2001, Putnam
2002, Hoghe and Stolle 2003). Here a major question is how civic
institutions contribute to general trust within society and between var-
ious players in the national domain and how this reflects on political
processes such as the development of democracies. While both lines
seem to suffer from the same bias, namely that civil society negotiates
state power—in the African context discredited by some as an outright
‘western fairy tale’ (see Markovitz 2002)—the lack of attention to the
religious in understanding civil society is also remarkable. Not only is
it a recent development that religious organizations have come to be
studied as social movements (see for instance Cristi 2001, van der Veer
2000) competing for space in the civil realm, increasingly the political
is also understood and analyzed as an expression of religious meaning
and thought (see for Ghana, for instance, Meyer and Nugent 2001).
This generates questions about the extent to which civic legitimacy and
civil morality are produced and negotiated by religious thought, possi-
bly as one of the many expressions of such ideas in a contested field
inhabited by other players such as labour unions, political parties, civil
rights movements and the like.
In the Netherlands the distinction between the civil and the civic is
also crucial for understanding the position of immigrant religion. For
long, Dutch civil society was segregated along religious lines, the so-
called religious ‘pillars’, whereby each religion, Protestantism and
Catholicism in particular, organized social life and took on civic respon-
sibilities, for example in the foundation of schools and hospitals (see
Post 1989 on the pillarization of Dutch civil life). Recently, however,
heated public debates have erupted about the establishment of Islamic
schools and the nature of their educational programmes. The consti-
tutional freedom of religion in the Netherlands also implies a right of
freedom of education in the sense that religious groups are allowed to
establish their own schools, thus assuring parents that their children
will be educated in an environment that reaffirms their religious principles.
Islam is the second religion in the Netherlands and adhered to by the
largest immigrant communities in the country, Moroccans and Turks.
The emergence of primary schools for children from these communities
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has led to public debates, not so much about the civil virtues being
taught by these schools, but about the civic responsibility constituted
in them to establish state-sponsored educational institutions that seem
to unsettle the ‘natural’ bond between Christian education and nation-
state formation in the creation of a Dutch citizenry. A leading ques-
tion in these public debates was and still is: while they certainly promote
civil morality, do these Islamic schools use their civic power to create
and implant ideas of Dutch citizenship in the minds of their pupils or
should questions be raised as to their loyalty towards the Dutch nation-
state?
In addition to the formation of large communities of Moroccan and
Turkish labour migrants, which started in the mid-1960s, the Netherlands
has also seen the arrival of numbers of immigrants from its former
colonies in the West Indies, Surinam in particular, and from other
Third World countries. Among the many immigrant groups that have
settled in the Netherlands over the past two decades, migrants arriving
from Ghana have been perceived by the Dutch state as especially prob-
lematic. In addition to the measures taken to curb immigration, specific
restrictions have been designed to deal with the largely unregulated
influx of Ghanaian migrants, an estimated 40,000 by now. Explicit
measures have been taken to check and control marriages of Ghanaians,
as these appear to have been an avenue by which many Ghanaians
acquired access to the Dutch welfare state, often through a system
known as the ‘contract marriage’. While the Dutch government was
putting in place checks and balances on what it perceived as a loop-
hole in its immigration policy, many new Ghanaian Pentecostal churches
were emerging in the Ghanaian migrant communities of larger Dutch
cities, consisting now of approximately 30 different denominations. These
churches have an average membership of 250 adults, including mem-
bers from the second generation of Ghanaian immigrants, usually mak-
ing for a youthful following. An important function of these churches
has been to create a context of morality and legitimacy in which mar-
riages can be officiated, marriages that are perceived as lawful and
righteous in the eyes of the migrant community, but which nonethe-
less do not have any legal basis as far as the Dutch state is concerned
and are therefore not recognized by Dutch law. In some cases these
marriages involve so-called illegal Ghanaian immigrants who do not
possess the necessary documents to cover their stay in the country.
This paper aims at demonstrating why the Ghanaian community
attributes such great moral significance to the marriages that take place
within the Pentecostal churches by exploring first of all the contested
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cultural meaning of marriage in Pentecostalism ‘back home’ in Ghana.
Many migrants are aware of this cultural contestation when they arrive
in the Netherlands, only to find that this is once more compounded in
the context of the tough immigration policies adopted by the Dutch
state. In the second part of the paper, the changing meaning of the
civic functions of the Pentecostal churches in Ghana and the Netherlands
is investigated by looking at marriages taking place within the migrant
community and the way in which legitimacy is created as well as con-
tested in the context of this western nation-state. It will become clear
why in both situations this kind of Pentecostalism is unlikely to develop
into a civic religion in the full sense of the term in the host society,
unlike its present status in Ghana.
Contestations of marriage
There is a limited literature on the meaning of African marriage sys-
tems in a globalizing world (see Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, Masquelier
2004), a lacuna that is remarkable given the increasingly transnational
nature of the ways in which marriages are arranged in African com-
munities. This certainly applies to the Ghanaian migrant communities
that I have been studying in places such as The Hague (the Netherlands,
van Dijk 2001b, 2002a) and Gaborone (Botswana, van Dijk 2003),
where most arrangements for a wedding involve multi-stranded rela-
tions with people ‘back home’, and in a variety of other places around
the world (see also Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 1998, Manuh 1998).1
In Ghana there is a great attraction in marrying somebody who has
been able to ‘make it’ abroad, often in the hope of being able to join
the newly wedded spouse and thus leave Ghana. It is important to note
that in this process of increasing transnationalization of marriage rela-
tionships in Ghana the recently established Pentecostal churches are
playing a crucial role. The rise of Pentecostalism in Ghana and in other
African countries has a significant transnational element to it (see van
Dijk 1997, 2000, 2001a, 2004, Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001,
Englund 2001, 2003, de Witte 2003). Many churches have been eager
to establish congregations outside Ghana and have been able to do so
in Europe, particularly in large cities such as London, Amsterdam,
Hamburg and Brussels. Many Ghanaians are attracted to these newly
emerging Pentecostal churches because of their extensive international
relations and cosmopolitan outlook, in addition to their ideological mes-
sages of success, prosperity and deliverance from evil powers. Whereas
they strongly proclaim ideas concerning the Christianization of society
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and the Ghanaian nation-state, and also hold promises for the creation
of a modern ‘born-again’ personhood, these ideas imply the critical val-
uation of ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ as well.
The embrace of a globalizing world, in which Pentecostalism offers
a trajectory for creating and sustaining a specific identity in other social
contexts, is conjoined by a critical attitude with regard to cultural prac-
tices. These Pentecostal churches often place themselves on this basis
in opposition to what are referred to in the literature as prophet/spirit
healing or African Independent churches (AICs), which emerged in
great numbers in the early decades of the twentieth century. While the
two groups of churches share a cosmology inhabited by a variety of
spiritual powers, deities and ambiguous forces, the healing churches (in
the vernacular known as Sunsum sorè, lit. ‘spirit-churches’) combine in
a syncretic manner elements of missionary Christianity with healing
paradigms and practices that derive from African historical religious
traditions.2 From the perspective of the Pentecostal churches, true
Christianity should be purified from syncretic elements as they may sig-
nal the presence of ancestral and other powers Pentecostalism usually
qualifies as being ‘demonic’. The presentation of a modernist and
dichotomist world-view, leaving no middle ground for powers that may
ambiguously work for good or for evil, means first of all that healing
is exclusively defined in terms of prayer-healing and the manifestation
of the Holy Spirit through the charismata, such as speaking in tongues,
the laying on of hands and deliverance. It also means, however, that
an ideological tension is created related to other forms of cultural life
where the presence of an ancestral past can be suspected as well.
Pentecostal rhetoric tends to make its followers aware of the demonic
dangers that may lie hidden in practices that are otherwise viewed as
‘custom’. Most Pentecostal leaders desist from and reject a practice such
as that of pouring libation (nsa) to honour ancestral deities and to invite
them to come and drink in exchange for bestowing their favours on
the living.
Whereas this iconoclastic stance of Pentecostalism certainly impinges
on family and communal ritual, for instance in the context of cere-
monies related to birthing, marriage and most specifically funerals, it
also has a profound bearing on the ways in which they perceive Ghanaian
nation-state cultural policies. Various postcolonial Ghanaian govern-
ments have been proactive in promoting a cultural policy calling for
the protection and rejuvenation of pre-colonial traditions. The Ghanaian
state has developed all sorts of initiatives for the enunciation of a national
cultural heritage policy, among them the formation of a subsidizing
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body known as the National Commission on Culture. The most important
Pentecostal churches in cities like the capital Accra have remained
ambivalent if not hostile towards this project aimed at the creation of
a non-Christian national cultural identity. Great was their outcry, for
instance, when, on an official visit of the then American President
Clinton, a pouring of libation to the gods took place on his arrival,
televized for all to see as an expression not only of welcome but of
authentic Ghanaian cultural roots. The Pentecostals’ disrespect for local
cultural traditions has in some communities led to occasional incidents
of violence, a situation which the national government finds it difficult
to contain (see van Dijk 2001c on the issue of the Pentecostals’ violation
of the bans on drumming and noise-making that some ethnic com-
munities announce during certain periods throughout the year).
It is in this context of a Pentecostal contestation of culture and cus-
tom that the issue of marriage has also become a matter of debate
(van Dijk 2002b). In many of the Pentecostal churches an explicit dis-
course has developed on marriage, evidenced by the many booklets,
brochures and pamphlets that circulate extensively in Pentecostal circles
dealing with notions of the true Christian marriage. A large part of
this literature has been written by the leader-founders of these Pentecostal
churches and is based on the statements they have been delivering from
the pulpit. Both these messages and their writings on the subject may
strike us as being ‘western’ in orientation and as emphasizing a kind
of bourgeois morality in matters of choice of partner, sexuality and
family authority, coming across as typically middle class. As this liter-
ature usually tells very little about the actual, local and everyday prac-
tices relating to these issues, but instead often deals at length with how
matters ought to be arranged and how family relationships ought to look,
it reveals a distancing and estranging point of view with regard to lived-
in culture; it makes the common look peculiar and vice versa. Lengthy
discussions can be devoted in church meetings to issues such as ‘the
good wife’ or ‘fatherly authority’ which appear far removed from mun-
dane realities and only seem to represent a deliberate attempt of dis-
sociation from the world of their followers. The picture this draws of
the Christian marriage and family life seems to instigate in their followers
the need to seek marriage enrichment, as it is often called, through the
mediation of Pentecostal leaders.
On the basis of this ideology many churches engage in marriage
counselling. It is in fact one of the most complicated domains of inter-
action of the churches and the individual lives of their members. This
complication arises from the coming together of the stringent Pentecostal
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ideology, the actual marital status of those engaged in the process and
thirdly the fact that civic authority has been vested in pastors to officiate
at weddings and certify marriages, making them legally binding if and
when these pastors are ordained. Ordained pastors can certify mar-
riages by signing marriage certificates of the couples that have entered
into holy matrimony in their churches. This element of the pastor’s
civic authority is well respected, fully acknowledged by the state and
the Registrar’s office, and most pastor-leaders that I included in my
research indeed claim to make every effort to perform their duties in
this regard to the best of their ability. This entails among other things
a careful investigation of the background of the prospective marriage
partners and the conditions under which a marriage takes place. Marriage
counselling is a euphemism for a method through which the pastor
assures himself of the genuine motives of the partners, inquires about
their previous relationships (also about any children that may have been
born out of these relationships), looks into the moral standing of the
partners (religious affiliation, criminal behaviour), scrutinizes the rela-
tionship with the respective families and family heads so as to acquire
confirmation of their consent, and discusses the ways in which the cou-
ple will establish their household.
Most churches have counselling committees that assist in such an
investigation, often composed of the most prominent and well respected
members of the congregation. The authority of the pastor is such that
he will even contact the heads of the respective families to ask ques-
tions that otherwise would be considered inappropriate. Inquiries are
made about the terms of the marriage—terms that usually are negoti-
ated between the families and often involve a kind of bride wealth to
be transferred from the family of the husband to that of the wife at
the time of kokooko. This is, literally, the time of ‘knocking at the door’
of representatives of the husband at the house of the bride’s parents;
kokooko representing the sound of the tapping of fingers on a wooden
door or gate. Commonly the kokooko implies a prestation of many lux-
urious gifts and money to the wife’s family, all of which takes place in
a festive atmosphere with invited guests being present to witness the
occasion. There is a politics of signification here as the Pentecostal lead-
ers tend to refer to this occasion as being nothing but an ‘engagement’,
that is a preliminary stage to the most important event that should still
follow: the ‘white’ wedding in church when the marriage certificate will
be signed. The Pentecostal leaders, however, fully understand the cul-
tural significance of the ‘engagement’ and all the negotiations that are
held between the families on the terms of the marriage. Only then will
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the marriage carry weight and be seen as legitimate with all the respon-
sibilities this implies. Non-Pentecostals often refer to the kokooko as the
wedding proper because in their eyes conducting the customary exchange
of lavish gifts and the payment of sums of money grants full legitimacy
to a couple’s marriage. Marriage certificates issued by an ordained min-
ister or the Registrar’s office do not help constitute the rights and oblig-
ations of marriage partners, they feel, because these are sufficiently
embedded in the common understanding of what the two families have
agreed upon. These arranged marriages stand in contrast to marriages
by elopement which, though they can still be acknowledged in formal
terms (for instance where inheritance is concerned), usually involve not
much more than a couple appearing before a chief or another tradi-
tional authority that can grant them permission to live together, thus
securing the acknowledgement of the children from this relationship.
The minute inspection of the conditions of the kokooko by the pastors
also implies that they perceive their authority to be above that of the
family heads, and they proclaim that they have the final word in approv-
ing the union. There is an element of suspicion with regard to these
family heads, in the sense that pressures on the couple from their fam-
ilies may run so high that they are in danger of giving in to practices
that jeopardize Pentecostal standards and are likely lead the couple into
sin and temptation. These may vary from the use of alcoholic beverages
to the pouring of libation or the domain of sexuality particularly where
it concerns the ‘testing’ of the wife’s procreative capacity in the period
before the marriage takes place. Pastoral inspection can turn into inter-
vention leading to a direct involvement of the pastor with the marriage
affairs of the families, which often overruns if not replaces the author-
ity of the family head. Some Pentecostal churches, particularly the well
known International Central Gospel Church (ICGC) or Lighthouse
Chapel International, have developed aggressive strategies in this regard
for couples who have indicated that they are interested in marrying in
the church. In such cases pastors may even participate in the negoti-
ation between the families, dictating the ways in which the kokooko is
to be conducted and doing all they can to shift attention to the ‘white’
wedding so as to turn that occasion into the primary event. The ICGC
for instance makes sure that its marriage counselling committee has at
its disposal beautiful clothes to lend to the couple for their white wed-
ding in church and operates a nicely decorated house in one of the
middle-class neighbourhoods in Accra where the couple can spend their
wedding night, all under the watchful eye of one of its prominent female
members. In these ways the churches are capable of not only replacing
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traditional authority but also of shielding the couple from the kind of
influences for which they hold the family and its customs responsible.
Pastors also tend to make an explicit effort by being present during
the actual kokooko. This usually complicates matters further and is often
the source of barely concealed tensions. The point is that the pastors
are well aware of the fact that, whereas the couple may have indicated
their desire to marry in Pentecostal fashion, most of their families may
not be born-again Pentecostals and may not be inclined to acknowledge
the authority of the pastor. I have witnessed a number of instances
where verbal abuse occurred, directed against the presence of the pastors.
On one such an instance an elderly man, belonging to the husband’s
party presenting gifts to the relatives of the prospective wife, rose to
his feet demanding in an authoritarian voice that ‘we must maintain
our customs; there should be alcohol!’. Pointing at the refreshments
that were distributed to the guests, he appeared to be angered by the
fact that instead of the customary alcoholic beverages soft drinks were
being handed out. He then continued by pointing at the pastor of the
Harvest Ministries International who represented the church of the cou-
ple and who in his view was directly to blame for this infringement of
cultural values. The embarrassing situation got out of hand when in
reaction to his anger people began to shout at one another, risking
ruining the ceremony which should have been the pinnacle of successful
marriage negotiations. Friends of the couple quickly took action, escorting
the man to a distant corner of the compound and offering him some
beer, out of sight of everyone else. On another occasion matters became
complex because one of the ‘fathers’ of the bride (FABRO) happened
to be a ohene, a chief, who was to be respected for his office particu-
larly when he appeared in his full paraphernalia. Ritual gin (the so-
called Schiedam Schnapps) was offered to him, something the couple,
being confirmed Pentecostal believers, did not want to be involved in.
Matters were resolved by offering the chief a place of honour in the
house where the meeting was being held, and offering him some alco-
holic beverages there, again out of sight of anybody else (chiefs are, 
in fact, supposed to consume food and drink out of sight of the 
public).
Once a marriage has taken place, most Pentecostal churches con-
tinue to engage with a couple by stressing the formation of the kind
of conjugal relationships that keep the ‘backward’ family obligations at
bay. One aspect of this ideology relates to the investments that a man
and wife will make for their old age. The Pentecostal churches tend
to stress that true Pentecostal couples should keep no secrets about each
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other’s income and that savings and investments should be for the
benefit of both partners and their children. This ideology follows closely
some of the laws the PNDC-Rawlings government3 has been imple-
menting in the last decade that affect customary family inheritance
rules. These PNDC laws 111-114, generally known as the Intestate and
Succession Law, were accepted by parliament in 1985 and were meant
to implement and validate rules of inheritance which make it possible
to prevent the matrilineage from taking hold of a man’s property at
death (see Awusabo-Asare 1990). In many of Ghana’s predominantly
Asante matrilineal family systems, inheritance would follow the line of
the mother’s brother. A person would inherit from his mother’s brother
and not from his own father. The new laws, however, have put in
place a ‘defence’ for any man to ensure that his own children, and not
the nephews from the mother’s side, inherit his property on his death.
In other words, these laws strengthen the conjugal relationship against
the interests of the extended family. Pentecostalism has taken this up
and carried it much further as an ideology to control expenditure. Each
conjugal ‘unit’ is expected to spend one tenth of its net income on the
church (the biblical law of tithing). Only when tithing has been closely
adhered to can the Pentecostal believer rest assured that gifts to his
wider family can safely proceed.
Pentecostal pastors are inclined to boast about these confrontational
practices that stand in clear contrast to those of the ministers and pas-
tors of the established and mainline Christian churches, Roman Catholic,
Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist. The ordained ministers and pas-
tors of these churches officiate at marriages as well and claim a long
history of their churches being at the vanguard of Christianizing mar-
riage practices on the West African coast. Nevertheless, from the per-
spective of the Pentecostal churches, this effort has been nothing but
’superficial’ and ‘lukewarm’, and has not effectively altered ‘traditional’
practices, but instead accommodated them in forms that are nothing
else but ‘performance’. The Pentecostals perceive of these marriage
practices in the established churches as a ‘thin layer’ of Christian cul-
ture, de facto leaving unaffected what goes on in a much more cultural
understanding of marriage relations, faithfulness, marital responsibilities
and the authority of the husband. A second element of this moral con-
testation is that the Pentecostal leaders tend to define marriage rela-
tions in terms of the conjugal bond as a consequence of the ideological
project they are engaged in that promotes the nuclear family over the
extended family. In their view, the established churches are much more
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in favour of maintaining, emphasizing and underscoring extended fam-
ily relations, confirming—in their eyes—the prototypical structure of
African family life. In the Pentecostal rhetoric, however, the extended
family is a liability to any newly wedded couple, something that may
jeopardize the frail conjugal bond between husband and wife, and some-
thing that may tie the couple in all sorts of reciprocal relations over
which they so easily run the risk of losing control. Marriage counselling
therefore consists of lengthy discussions of what gift-giving means, what
reciprocal obligations entail and how they should be dealt with in
defence of the socio-economic ties within the nuclear family.
And last but not least there is the hotly debated issue of alcohol.
Wedding parties of couples marrying in the established churches usu-
ally involve ‘boozing’ as the Pentecostals call it, mostly because none
of the parties involved have misgivings about it. For the Pentecostals
the issue is not only drunkenness or other forms of indecent behav-
iour, but the entire world of ancestral veneration that is related to the
use of alcohol in ritual practice. Alcohol conjures up a world of ambigu-
ous supernatural relations and sanctifications, which in the Pentecostal
view are of sheer demonic quality. Ancestral deities are the accomplices
of none other than the Devil, forces whose existence should not be
denied but should be reckoned with, with all the precautions and coun-
tervailing powers a true Christian hopes to rely on. The established
churches do not seem to entertain specific ideas about the dangers of
alcohol and often do not move against its use. However, while the
Pentecostals reject the mainline churches’ moral laxity, they know they
stand accused of having to accommodate the use of alcohol. When
non-Pentecostal family members demand alcohol during wedding cer-
emonies the pastors tend to negotiate a strict solution for the couple,
telling them to give money to those family members that want to buy
and consume alcoholic beverages. In this way the couple can be seen
to give money, thereby increasing the respect they receive from their
family members for being so considerate about the family’s need, while
they themselves can still pretend that they have no knowledge of what
these members have in fact done with it. Although the Pentecostal wed-
ding has gained popularity because of its moral prestige and the com-
mon idea that it is less costly because of the absence of expensive
alcoholic beverages, in reality expenses on drinks can still be considerable.
What the Pentecostals do share with the mainline churches is the
civic nature of their marriages. For both Christian groupings it is clear
that the customary marriage, in terms of the kokooko, is a crucial but
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nonetheless ‘traditional’ step towards a fully officiated and acknowl-
edged marriage. Both groups view the kokooko as an engagement to be
followed by a public ceremony in church where the marriage will be
formally recorded on paper. The civic process is two-pronged: on the
one hand the acknowledgement and recording of the marriage as a
formal arrangement is taken away from the domain of social memory.
Customarily marriages were only ‘recorded’ in memory, but the record-
ing by the churches contributes to the bureaucratic recording of the
relationship and enhances the public legitimacy of church and wedding
simultaneously. On the other hand the churches’ ritual practice becomes
an instrument in the nation-state project of the state’s vested interest
in knowing and controlling its citizenry. In terms of Mamdani’s Citizen
and Subject (1996, see also 2000) the churches play a constitutive role
in turning their members away from the status of African cultural sub-
jects in view of their customary rulers and authority structures, to that
of the citizen entertaining individualized rights and obligations in the
context of a liberal state. Failing the creation of an effective civil ser-
vice and an efficient registry and taxonomy in terms of recording iden-
tities and civil relations, the state embraces the function performed by
the churches, although it usually has no means of assessing the status
of the pastors that claim to have been ordained.
The enormous proliferation of churches over the past decades has
complicated matters and although newspaper reports appear occasion-
ally on cases of fraudulent activities of some pastors, the Ghanaian state
has thus far only welcomed the contribution these churches have made
to this element of state formation. For the Pentecostals who usually
have little internal regulatory power to deal with fraudulent cases (most
of these churches are of the one-man type and therefore are not included
in umbrella organizations with vested powers of control and inspection
such as is the case in denominations) the prestige their marriage prac-
tices acquire in Pentecostal circles is predominantly based on what they
perceive as an emancipation from the claws of cultural history and
memory. Their discourse of control and inspection of marriage rela-
tions is based more on the cultural aspects than the elements of citi-
zenship that are also contained in it. While many genuine Pentecostal
leaders find fraudulence in the ‘paper work’ of marriages damaging to
their status and prestige, and tend to proclaim that there are always
rotten apples in any basket, they are usually much more concerned
about the cultural implications of the relationship. The paper work is
an effective means of contesting social memory and cultural obligations,
an important reason for them to embrace the state-like model of ‘fixing’
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identities in signed and sealed papers. However, in the diaspora the
opposite appears to be true, as the cultural aspects of the marriage
relationship become prominent again.
Ghanaian marriage in the diaspora
Since the arrival of large numbers of Ghanaian migrants in Europe,
and particularly in the Netherlands, following the crises that deeply
affected Ghana’s economic and political stability in the 1970s and early
1980s, marriage has been a critical issue. Although Ghanaians per-
ceived of migrating to Europe as a highly individualistic affair, the need
to create and establish social bonds often became crucial immediately
after arrival. The settlement and growth of the Ghanaian migrant com-
munity in the Netherlands, now totalling an estimated 40,000, was cer-
tainly based to a large extent on marriage relationships. The reason
why marriage became so important for immigrant groups like Ghanaians
in the Netherlands was and still is precisely its civic nature and the
‘papers’ attached to it. Marriage became an important ‘entry ticket’ for
many migrant groups into the Dutch welfare state and over the last
two decades has acquired a highly contested significance in the con-
text of Dutch immigration and identity policies. In that context mar-
riage became a matter of investigation for the Dutch police and a range
of special measures were taken, making marriage an important element
in a tightening of identity politics in the Dutch state.
The history of this toughening of identity politics began with the
post-World War II reconstruction period, which saw an ever-increasing
demand for labour power in Dutch society (as elsewhere in western
European society in the 1950s and 1960s, see Cohen 1987: 111-137).
From the early 1960s, labour recruitment began to take place in regions
immediately bordering on western Europe where labour was still rea-
sonably cheap and readily available. A newly styled multicultural society
was born. Recruitment teams were sent out to, among other countries,
Morocco, Greece and Turkey, to enlist young men to work in specific
Dutch companies or sectors, for example greenhouse horticultural pro-
duction.
The so-called ‘free recruitment’ of labour was officially halted in
1973-1974 as a consequence of the tightening of the economic situa-
tion in the Netherlands (and elsewhere in Europe for that matter) which
followed the oil crisis. Towards the end of the 1970s the Dutch labour
market, however, showed shortages again, but this time no organized
recruitment of labour from elsewhere took place. Instead groups from
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other parts of the world saw chances of benefiting from the very attrac-
tive Dutch labour market. In some cases, such as in the Ghanaian case,
this coincided with economic crises in their home countries. Towards
the end of the 1980s a massive and forced expulsion of Ghanaian
labour from Nigeria had taken place (some records speak of more than
a million people) and many of these Ghanaians were looking for oppor-
tunities elsewhere in the world. Ghana’s economy was rapidly deterio-
rating, aggravated by a deep political crisis, and a coup d’état in 1981
brought to power Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who ruled the
country thereafter for more than twenty years. For many, returning to
Ghana was not an option, while Europe appeared to be a place of sta-
bility and prosperity. Migration focused not only on the former colo-
nizer Great Britain, but particularly on countries such as Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands where immigration was relatively easy. Sizeable
Ghanaian migrant communities emerged in cities such as London,
Hamburg, Frankfurt, Milan, Naples and Amsterdam.
By 1995 it was estimated that more than 12 percent of the entire
Ghanaian population was living abroad (Peil 1995: 345), and that, after
cocoa and gold, migrant remittances had become the third main source
of income in Ghana.4 In the course of just a couple of years the
Ghanaian migrant community in Amsterdam had grown to tens of
thousands, concentrated particularly in the low-cost housing area in the
south of the city, which rapidly came to be seen as a ghettoized area.
Ghanaians found all sorts of low-paying odd jobs and many began
working without the required permits. The increase in numbers of
migrants not only from Ghana but from other parts of the world in
unregulated employment and without formal status of any kind soon
led to policies concerning the containment of ‘illegality’ in the Netherlands.
Towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, Africa came to figure
as a force largely responsible for undercutting the efforts of the Dutch
state, which had been developing techniques to control access to the
common goods of its welfare society.
From the 1980s onwards, a widely shared, public concern with ‘ille-
gality’ (in Dutch het illegalen-vraagstuk) developed. Wild guesses began cir-
culating in Dutch politics about the total size of the illegal migrant
labour population and the extent of the damage perceived to be done
to the Dutch economy. From the late 1980s, this concern also focused
on Ghanaian migrants as police officials initiated a public debate about
the number of illegal Ghanaians supposedly living in such low-cost
housing areas of places such as Amsterdam, and suggested a link between
the numbers of illegal Ghanaians and the rising crime rate. In contrast
with other ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, disproportionate atten-
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tion was focused by Dutch officials on the West African community.
It was soon estimated that the number of ‘undocumented’ West Africans
was likely to double, if not triple, official figures of Ghanaians (see van
den Broek 1992). West African identities came to occupy the centre of
the public’s concern with ‘open borders’ of the Netherlands.
The Dutch government began introducing a series of laws aimed at
curtailing illegal immigration and with the hope of enhancing the state’s
effectiveness in supervising civic society (see Staring 1998, van der Leun
1998). Among these laws and measures were the introduction of the
so-called SoFi number in the early 1980s, a fiscal code given by the
Dutch state to every citizen at birth making it possible to keep track
of a person’s income, tax status and social security claims, and a law
making it compulsory to be able to prove one’s identity whenever asked
at one’s place of work (Wet Identificatieplicht). This trend culminated in
April 1996 with the publication of yet another government ruling, which
came to be known as the ‘Probleemlanden circulaire’ (the Circular Letter
on Problem Countries). This circular blacklisted five countries, Ghana
in particular, for having a notorious record of producing fraudulent
identity documents. In addition to the normal procedures for migra-
tion and documents, from now on another instrument would be added
to control immigration from these countries, ‘verification’ (verificatie). It
implies that for any identity document required by Ghanaians in the
Netherlands (passport, marriage certificate, birth certificate etc.) the
Dutch government is entitled to investigate the person’s identity in the
country of origin in whatever way the authorities feel necessary. Such
investigations, carried out by Dutch officials in Ghana, usually with the
help of local informants and detectives, involve the interrogation of rel-
atives, friends and colleagues, researching school, church and hospital
for any further information on the person.
The impact of these measures on the Ghanaian migrant community
have been important, particularly as they were related to the preven-
tion of a particular type of marriage—the contract marriage. A law
that sought to prohibit contract marriages (Wet Schijn-huwelijken), aimed
at limiting the possibility of using marriage to gain entry into Dutch
society, did not deliver the desired results. Although the law allowed
investigations by police officers into the true nature of any marriage
with a foreigner, it appeared towards the end of the 1980s that Ghanaians
and other immigrants had been using the contract marriage as a loop-
hole for gaining entry into the Netherlands. In interviews I conducted
in the Ghanaian community in The Hague it became clear that men
had been spending considerable sums of money on arranging contract
marriages with Dutch nationals, particularly persons of Surinamese
JRA 606_438-467  11/18/04  1:26 PM  Page 453
454 Rijk van Dijk
descent. Sums of money spent on these marriages sometimes could be
as much as $10,000 or more and were often the subject of exploitative
relations in which illegal marriage brokers played a part. Any marriage
to a foreigner is expected to last for three years before a foreigner is
allowed to settle in the Netherlands independently of his/her spouse,
provided that he or she has been able to secure employment. A contract
marriage therefore had to exist for at least these three years, making
sure that it would meet all the appearances of being a real marriage
of two people de facto living together and sharing the same bed. In the
case of any suspicion regarding the true nature of a marriage, police
officers were and are allowed under the law ‘Schijnhuwelijken’ to make
investigations, and, as a popular joke would have it, to ‘count the
number of toothbrushes in the bathroom’. Proof of guilt would result
in the deportation of the foreigner back to his or her home country
and a lawsuit against the Dutch citizen, once a contract relation was
discovered.5
‘Marriage’ quickly became a sensitive matter in the Ghanaian migrant
community, leading to many complexities in the various types of rela-
tionship any person could be involved in. As far as men were con-
cerned, these relationships could easily consist of four types simultaneously.
The first would be the relationship with the wife still residing in Ghana
or elsewhere to whom the person was married to according to for-
malized law in Ghana. A second relationship could exist in the form
of a customary marriage because the statutory marriage does not exclude
the possibility of being married according to ‘custom’ in addition to a
‘White’ marriage (this is true less for women than for men). The third
relationship concerns the one in the diaspora relating to the partner of
a contractual relationship, which one may need to be able to stay in
the Netherlands. While this usually implies not living with that con-
tractual partner in reality, most man would therefore also be living with
a woman (usually a Ghanaian) ‘who is cooking my food’, as it is
euphemistically referred to, thus forming the fourth type of relation-
ship. The apparently simple question, ‘Are you married?’, which I ini-
tially used to ask my interlocutors during fieldwork interviews, quickly
proved to be a domain of confusion, embarrassment or evasive answers.
The term ‘marriage’ could be interpreted to mean very different things
depending on context and situation, and the answer to the question
could also jeopardize the status of the respondent living in the Netherlands
if it brought to light the fact that the person was involved in a con-
tractual relationship as well.
The increasing pressure related to the police investigation of marriage
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relationships, particularly those of Ghanaians, made matters worse. After
all, the contract marriage was basically perceived by Ghanaian men as
a costly but temporary affair. Many of the migrants had hoped to be
able to marry prospective partners in Ghana or to bring their spouses
to the Netherlands; an outcome which in the course of the 1990s
became virtually impossible as all sorts of ‘verified’ documents were
requested which proved very hard to come by (birth, marriage or ‘bach-
elor certificates’). Back home in Ghana, questioning by local detectives
of relatives, friends, church leaders and others about personal identities
became a nightmare leading to confusion, intimidation, suspicion and
family rivalries.
Within the Ghanaian community in The Hague these measures were
increasingly being perceived as insulting and a blow to dignity, respect
and self-esteem, unlike the perspective of Dutch officials for whom the
exercise of verification and investigation of marriages represented a
‘technical’ response to the failure of attempts to tighten access to the
Netherlands. Many Ghanaian men and, to a lesser extent, women were
facing an investigation into their existing or prospective marriage rela-
tions by Dutch officials, while they were also faced with the problem
of the moral standing of their relationships from the perspective of their
families and the social control of the wider community. Families back
home did not always understand the nature of contract marriages or
the nature of the investigations that Dutch officials were making of
their son’s and daughter’s identity and civic status. Wives in Ghana
complained bitterly about the moral status of their husbands in the
diaspora, and in many cases hopes were high regarding the prospect
of being able to leave Ghana and join their lawful husbands in Europe.
Pressures increased on the Ghanaian men in the diaspora, expecting
them to be sensitive to their (prospective) spouses’ desires to be fetched
from Ghana, pressures from which the men found it hard to escape.
In some cases they also had to face occult threats, resulting from the
fact that families in Ghana entertained extremely high expectations of
what it would bring them if one of their daughters would marry or
join a partner living in Europe. I met men who for this reason had
become fearful of travelling to Ghana, anxious as they were to meet
members of the family of the women they were supposedly married to
or engaged to, and to whom they could not fulfil the promises they
once had made. Families back home would hear gossip about men hav-
ing affairs with other women while in Europe, the loose morals that
European societies displayed and the disrespect for customary practices
and morals there. These rumours were once more strengthened when
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stories emerged in Ghana of Ghanaian women becoming involved in
prostitution circles in Europe, even when they had lawfully wedded
husbands living in Ghana, Europe or elsewhere.6
This touches upon a further aspect of the perceived vulnerability of
marriage, the increasingly transnational nature of marriage arrange-
ments of couples living in the diaspora. They have become ‘triple-sited’
in the sense of involving partners or families living ‘back home’, living
in a European country such as the Netherlands and living elsewhere,
usually in the USA. Consultations between families are increasingly cir-
cling around these various locations, while the actual wedding often
requires the involvement of people from these various locations to make
it all work. I have witnessed marriages where the husband or the wife
lives in the Netherlands with the partner living in Germany, England
or the USA but at the same time involving family representatives from
Ghana or from other places around the world. While this may be true
for many other migrant communities in the Netherlands and elsewhere,
the point is how these communities perceive this in moral terms and
how they subsequently deal with or determine the status of the mar-
riages concerned.
An important development that has taken place in response to the
contested nature of marriage relationships in the Ghanaian situation is
the establishment of Pentecostal churches in the community. They have
proved to be capable of forging a status model for the arrangement of
marriages within the community which, though not being civic in nature,
has in fact helped to rebuild elements of dignity and self-esteem for
those involved.
The Pentecostal marriage in the diaspora
The following story elucidates some aspects of the way in which the
Pentecostal churches in the diaspora play a role in restoring elements
of the civil nature of Ghanaian marriage relations, even if the mar-
riage will never have a civic status in the host country.
A Ghanaian friend of mine informed me that his eighteen-year-old stepdaughter
was going to get married, ‘although’, as he said, ’she shouldn’t be here’. He and
his Ghanaian wife were living in The Hague and belonged to the Ghanaian
migrant community there, which comprised an estimated 4,000 individuals. Although
his wife had a residence permit for the Netherlands, and he had applied for one
some time ago, he had not been granted one. His stay in the country was there-
fore de facto illegal, and so was that of his stepdaughter, who had been born long
before his wife migrated to the Netherlands and the two had met. His stay in
The Hague and that of his adoptive daughter were in constant jeopardy, risking
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deportation back to Ghana. She had joined his household a couple of years ago,
coming directly from Ghana.
After settling in The Hague, he had become a prominent and widely respected
member of one of the eleven Ghanaian Pentecostal churches in the city. Knowing
that by marrying his wife, who had a residence permit, he would not only qual-
ify for a permit as well but would also become the subject of obtrusive investiga-
tions of the nature of that marriage, he quickly arranged for the wedding to take
place under the auspices of the newly established Ghanaian Pentecostal church to
which they belonged. The pastor did all he could to ensure that he was not going
‘to put together in holy matrimony that which is unholy in God’s eyes’ and thus
had been making extensive inquiries into the couple’s background and their fam-
ilies in Ghana. The wedding had subsequently indeed been held in church in
Pentecostal style (‘expensive clothing!’ my friend particularly emphasized) and for
the local community the status of their marriage had become unquestionable. The
church wedding also helped to underline his genuine motive and ‘love’ for his
Ghanaian partner, although a civic marriage could still not take place.
Now it was his daughter’s turn. The worries were that her illegal stay in the
country was going to be noticed by the authorities. In addition there were con-
cerns about what my friend termed ‘the weak morality of Dutch society’, by which
he specifically meant sexual permissiveness and free relations between adolescent
boys and girls. An increasing urge was felt to secure both her residential as well
as her moral position in the community. Soon a suitable spouse was found in one
of the other Ghanaian Pentecostal churches in the city. The two pastors discussed
and agreed upon the matter and it appeared that the young man was in posses-
sion of a residence permit. Things could not have been better and although the
girl was only eighteen years old the two pastors moved swiftly to mediate the 
marriage between the family representatives of the couple in The Hague, and
between The Hague and Ghana. The ‘white wedding’ took place in the husband’s
church and was attended by a large section of the Ghanaian community. The 
festivities as well as the pastoral blessings all underlined the moral standing and
legitimacy of the marriage, despite the fact that no formal law in the Netherlands
or in Ghana would recognize it. Nevertheless, this timely marriage saved the 
family and particularly my friend’s status from embarrassment regarding both 
possible investigations and community gossip about the things adolescent girls can
get themselves involved in The Netherlands, even under the very eyes of their
parents.
This example demonstrates that, although the Ghanaian Pentecostal
churches in the Netherlands cannot pursue a civic marriage as a kind
of strategy for countering ‘culture’ in the way their partner churches
in Ghana are doing, the similarity is still striking in the way in which
marriage remains a domain of contestation. The cultural complexities
the Pentecostal churches in the diaspora are dealing with are manifold.
On the one hand they face the same difficulties as the Pentecostal
churches back home in Ghana. Some Ghanaian Pentecostal churches
in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe operate as branches or
satellite congregations of larger churches that have their headquarters
in Ghana. Important examples of these transnationalized churches are
the International Central Gospel Church of Mensa Otabil, the Lighthouse
Chapel International of Dag Heward Mills and the International Word
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Miracle Church of Charles Asare. Similar to the more denominational
Pentecostal churches, such as the Church of Pentecost or the Assemblies
of God, these churches run their international connections and over-
seas branches in accordance with strict rules and regulations set out by
the overall leadership of the church. The overseas branches are expected
to follow whatever guidelines their headquarters have laid down, par-
ticularly on such important issues as marriages, funerals or outdooring
ceremonies.
At the time fieldwork took place in The Hague, out of the six
Ghanaian-led churches that were established in the city since the mid-
1980s, three were satellite congregations of Ghana-based churches,
namely the Church of Pentecost, the Christian Outreach Mission
International and the Global Revival Ministries International. The other
Ghanaian churches have been established in the diaspora, have their
headquarters in one of the European cities and started satellite con-
gregations in places such as The Hague while also establishing branches
‘back home’ in Ghana. While the other three were of this type, car-
rying names such as the Acts Revival Church International, one of
them, the Rhema Gospel Church International, made an explicit effort
to begin a satellite congregation operating from The Hague in Accra
in one of the latter’s newly emerging suburbs known as Mile 7. Each
of these churches has a membership of 150-250 adults on average in
a community totalling an estimated 4,000 Ghanaian nationals. Because
of the growth in numbers of Ghanaian churches in The Hague (I
counted eleven in 2001) the average number of members per church
has been somewhat declining over the years, in some cases caused by
the internal splits of these churches. Throughout, the churches main-
tained a high level of moral authority in the community as not many
of the Ghanaian migrants took up membership of one the existing
Dutch churches in the city, the language barrier being a factor of
importance here. Overall, contact between Ghanaian and Dutch churches
has remained extremely limited and usually only a few Dutch could
be seen to attend the Ghanaian church services or other meetings.
One way in which the churches involved themselves in the lives of
many Ghanaians in the city was and still is by organizing a wide vari-
ety of meetings for prayer and deliverance, for women’s, men’s and
youth fellowships, choir practice, special ‘harvests’ (collections of money)
and so on. While many Ghanaians are working long, hard hours com-
monly in semi-skilled types of employment, usually having more than
one job at the same time, the church meetings also represented a form
of entertainment and sociability, limiting to some extent the level to
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which their members could become involved in things outside the com-
munity. Responsibility and morality in this sense go hand in hand with
some level of social control, welcomed by many in a situation of per-
sisting unfamiliarity with Dutch society. Perhaps the highest level of
interaction exists with one or two specific Dutch Pentecostal commu-
nities in which it is not uncommon to have English-speaking services.
This situation of relative isolation may have been more particular for
The Hague as compared to the situation of the Ghanaian community
in Amsterdam. Not only is the Amsterdam migrant community more
than five times larger, the interaction with Dutch and other religious
groups appears to have been a little more intense throughout the years,
while the number of Ghanaian-led Pentecostal churches is also much
larger (an estimated twenty).
In both places, Ghanaian interest groups, representing Ghanaian
migrant issues to the local authorities, were and still are keener to
engage in interaction with Dutch society.7 These interest groups are
comprised of different commonly ethnically based associations (in Twi
known as kuo) and mediate the position of the Ghanaian community
in general on the basis of minority policies the city councils are devel-
oping. Compared to the Ghanaian churches, however, these interest
groups hardly represent any form of moral authority, do not maintain
the kind of transnational linkages the churches appear to have, do not
develop specific links with Ghana, but rather focus on the living and
working conditions in the Netherlands. While their focus is local and
morally neutral, they place great emphasis on their role as mediators
between the Ghanaian citizens in the Netherlands and the local author-
ities, thus taking part in what can be considered the civil society where
the representation of minorities is concerned. In The Hague the local
interest group maintaining contact with the local authorities, known as
Ghanatta, has a small membership of only about twenty people, reflecting
the marginal status it has in the Ghanaian community. Though being
perceived by the authorities in The Hague as the representative body
for the Ghanaian people, and not the Ghanaian churches with their
far greater membership, in reality the Ghanaian community never per-
ceived Ghanatta as a body bestowed with civic responsibility and serving
the interest of civil morality. As the organization arranged big parties
from time to time, the churches were inclined to marginalize it even
further by proclaiming that the body only worked for ‘fun and enter-
tainment’ as one leader called it, never engaging itself in more serious
issues that would involve respectability and responsibility. Being transna-
tional in focus, the localized issues of the position of minorities in the
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city were not of much interest to the churches and their following and
the occasional talks with civil servants and policy-makers in The Hague
about such matters usually generated a minimum of interest.
The churches’ interest lies at a much wider level of interaction, not
contained by the specific local circumstances of staying in the Netherlands
but focused on the creation of a kind of morality that is relevant in
different locations at the same time. The fact that these churches are
established in the diaspora and become relevant back home and in
other places simultaneously means that Ghanaian Pentecostalism and
its ideas of responsibility and morality are being reproduced in many
places around the world at the same time. While, in the case of mar-
riage arrangements, this may lead to extensive processes of networking
along these transnational linkages, it may at the same time produce
different ideas and practices concerning the actual meaning and moral
status of an important function such as a wedding. The simultaneity
in the production of Pentecostalism does not necessarily imply a simul-
taneity in the production of meaning and moral status of such events.
It is in this context that churches operating from Ghana usually find
their overseas branches becoming too permissive in moral terms.
Particularly in matters of marriage and relationships, they feel they have
a mission to educate their overseas congregations and to keep them on
the ‘narrow path of salvation’, as a pastor of the Lighthouse Chapel
put it. Modernity is certainly no guarantee of a higher morality in their
perception of western societies. This means, however, that the overseas
Pentecostal churches are caught between two contesting ‘cultures’. On
the one hand, the Ghanaian context of Pentecostalism and the cultural
critique that appears to dominate Pentecostal practices in that context
is still considered relevant in the diaspora situation. As was the case in
the situation of my friend’s stepdaughter, the pastor of this church
closely scrutinized the wedding proceedings to make sure that tradi-
tional practices could not take over the arrangements and the cere-
mony. No kokooko took place in The Hague because the required
prestation of gifts from the husband’s family to her family was con-
ducted in Ghana, supervised by a pastor in Accra. The wedding took
place in church and a small party was organized at the husband’s par-
ents’ house, without alcoholic drinks or ‘lustful’ dancing, as both families
involved were churchgoers.
On the other hand, overseas branches are also expected to present
a cultural critique of their host society and to distance themselves from
the cultural practices and styles that seem to govern western arrange-
ments and ceremonies. To some extent, by so doing, the Pentecostal
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churches and their members take pride in their African and Ghanaian
style of marriage ceremonies, specifically where these concern styles of
beautification, clothing, adornment and so forth, while they critically
monitor what this ‘Ghanaian style’ actually entails. Miniskirts, extensive
jewellery, wild hair styles, ‘lustful’ dancing are things that go beyond
their religious limits and members are made aware in the diaspora
Pentecostal churches of what these limits mean. Within the Ghanaian
migrant community, finely tuned differences exist between marriages
that are arranged and conducted in a Pentecostal way compared to
those organized in a non-Pentecostal fashion. These differences may go
unnoticed by an outside observer of these festivities as they both appear
colourful, authentically ‘African’ and lively. For instance, while jewellery
of all kinds is highly appreciated and people generally like to demon-
strate their wealth and success in life by wearing expensive necklaces,
rings and watches, in Pentecostal circles men are not supposed to have
earrings, not even the earring that carries the highly popular ‘gye nyame’
(‘except God’) sign, a symbol well known in Ghanaian popular culture.
It is this kind of subtle and fine tuning of dress-codes, styles of behav-
iour and forms of responsibility that renders a specific civil morality to
the Pentecostal form of wedding. Some members of the Ghanaian com-
munity made clear to me that many newly wed couples had increas-
ingly opted for the Pentecostal form as it is usually less costly (no
alcoholic drinks, no expensive music bands) while it has a higher moral
status. ‘Outside the churches anybody can marry anybody’, a friend
explained. Even non-Pentecostal members of the community (a minor-
ity because of the overriding dominance of the Pentecostal faith in the
community) acknowledged without any hesitation the status symbol wed-
dings have within the context of the church. Marriages outside the
church easily give way to questions and gossip about the other rela-
tionships that either of the two partners may still be involved in.
These notions of responsibility and morality imply, almost automat-
ically, that the contract marriages are hardly ever conducted in grand
style with massive public attention, partying and ceremonies, and are
often arranged in silence. Costly as the contract marriage is anyway,
this form of marriage is perceived too much as something that is enforced
upon the migrant by the political system of the country, not something
to be enjoyed in a festive atmosphere.
In terms of hierarchy, the Pentecostal marriage is at the top, con-
testing the status of marriages arranged according to Dutch or general
western styles, or those arranged in ‘traditional’ or Ghanaian custom-
ary fashion. It produces its own domain of civic responsibility (the
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Pentecostal wedding is ‘formal’ in the eyes of the family and the com-
munity) while stressing a particular civil morality about it (in terms of
styles of behaviour and public respect and prestige). While much of the
Pentecostal involvement in the maintenance of this status hierarchy can
be explained by pointing to the community’s troubled external rela-
tions revolving around the issues of immigration, residence permits,
Ghanaian identity in the host society and so forth, it appears that these
considerations are relative when compared to internal factors of morality.
The Pentecostal leaders’ concern about establishing the newly wed cou-
ple as a nuclear family is similar to what leaders do in Ghana, a sense
of not being incorporated in an extended family life, but in fact gen-
erating a notion of independence with regard to family obligations and
responsibilities. Couples living in the diaspora are under considerable
pressure to take the needs of their respective family members to heart,
perhaps even more than would have been the case in Ghana. After
all, in many ways getting married in the diaspora offers the certainty
of being able to stay in the West, to make money and to engage in
reciprocal relations with both families of the couple at the same time.
Often the financial constraints become unbearable, and if reciprocal
obligations whereby money should be remitted on a regular basis to
relatives living in Ghana are not acknowledged, this tends to produce
anxieties of a supernatural kind. The Pentecostals’ claims of having
superior heavenly powers on their side, the presence of the Holy Spirit
in their midst through which speaking in tongues, prayer healing and
deliverance of evil powers becomes available for the true believer, is
deeply significant in this respect (van Dijk 1999).
Gift relations with relatives in particular signal a peril of spiritual
danger. Through gifting, evil powers of ancestral spirits and witchcraft
may present themselves in the lives of the giver and of the receiver.
In the marriage counselling that Pentecostal pastors organize for those
about to marry or those who have just married, these spiritual dangers
of reciprocity are spelled out at length, particularly so in the diaspora
situation. The community constantly feels itself besieged by dangers
from within. Misfortunes due to malevolent and unseen powers may
befall couples in their everyday lives. The expectations of their rela-
tives in Ghana run high and are hardly ever fully satisfied, often lead-
ing to jealousy (ahoye), a state of mind that makes people easily fall prey
to the forces of witchcraft. Occasionally the community is shaken by
forms of physical violence, loss of money or property or the unexpected
death of children, which are all taken to be signs of something wrong
in the spiritual domain that the couple has entered together. Hence
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the wedding of my friend’s daughter to her partner was indeed some-
thing that produced all these considerations of how their ‘nuclear’ status
could be safeguarded spiritually, how they should be counselled, what
their obligations would amount to, and most importantly how by
marrying in a Pentecostal church a superiority in the moral and spir-
itual protection of their relationship could be established. The marriage
ceremony in church therefore took place in a context of religious excite-
ment in which speaking in tongues (kasa foforoo: literally, speaking the
new language) was considered important as a sign of the benevolent
presence of the Holy Spirit. The marriage was not only ‘blessed’ by
the pastor of her husband’s church, but moreover ’sealed’ or ‘conse-
crated’ (nteho) so as to seal it off from malevolent spiritual powers.
It is in this respect that problems with the Dutch authorities con-
cerning ‘papers’ and identity may overshadow or even deeply affect a
marriage and a nuclear family. They can be interpreted as one of the
misfortunes caused by these malevolent powers. Hence, the issue that
is dealt with in the context of the churches is not so much the legiti-
macy of their functions with regard to the host society, but instead the
morality of these functions from the perspective of communal con-
sciousness. Questions of legitimacy—of their stay in the country, of their
identity papers, of their civic functions such as marriages—become trans-
lated and experienced in discourses of morality, i.e. the control of ulter-
ior powers, of reciprocal relations, of blessings, spiritual protection and
heavenly benevolence. Therefore uncivil relations are those whereby
men and women live together in an ‘unholy’ state, not blessed by a
pastor, not covered by the churches’ theology, and not investigated
according to the set rules and guidelines dictated by Pentecostal ide-
ologies. While pastors are aware of the fact that some of their mem-
bers live together outside marriage, and may understand some of the
reasons why, they do not cease to emphasize the need to have a bless-
ing for those relationships; a necessity not inspired by the desire to cre-
ate greater legitimacy in the host society, but inspired by the urge to
establish a moral community in a web of transnational linkages mov-
ing far beyond the perimeters of Dutch society.
Conclusion
The question thus remains as to whether the performance of civic
functions, such as marriages, has any relevance to the issues of social
respectability these churches are involved in both at home or abroad.
The existing literature appears to assume that particularly in the 
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diaspora the emergence of so many of these Pentecostal churches in
African migrant communities is related to, and should be understood
by, a quest for social respectability. Ter Haar, for instance, writes about
the Pentecostal faith of African migrants in Europe:
For many immigrants, their religious beliefs equip them with the spiritual strength
and social contacts necessary to survive, and even to begin the long climb up the
ladder of social respectability in a country which, like most parts of Western
Europe, has gradually become more hostile to foreigners. (Ter Haar 1998: 43)
Exploring the civic and civil nature of marriages within the diaspora
Ghanaian Pentecostal churches shows us otherwise. The extent to which
these churches take western or Dutch standards of social respectability
as their paradigmatic point of departure in the ways in which they
structure their functions remains to be seen. A ‘long climb up the lad-
der of social respectability’, where this is basically a western ladder, is
certainly not an unquestioned part of their ideology and praxis. Instead,
what can be noticed is that such concepts as ‘integration’ or ‘adapta-
tion’—certainly when they concern important functions in the life-cycle
of individual members—are hardly ever present, but indeed may even
become despised or contested. The Pentecostal marriage ceremonies
are not focused on ‘integration’ or ‘adaptation’ to Dutch standards but
instead create a critical negotiation of western norms and practices.
They are not focused on the Dutch ladder of social respectability nor
do they represent an urge to climb that ladder by seemingly fulfilling
Dutch or popular requirements of what a marriage should be. It is
instead fascinating to note how, in the diaspora more strongly than at
home, legitimacy is translated in specific ideological notions of moral-
ity. Again, these notions do not conform to those of a generally and
deeply secularized Dutch society where over the last decades marriage
in church has become exceptional. This quest for legitimacy in terms
of a Pentecostal morality apparently stands on its own feet, so to speak,
and negotiates Ghanaian cultural practices on the one hand and west-
ern notions of civicness and civility on the other.
The web of transnational relations through which Pentecostalism at
home connects with Pentecostal groups and ideologies outside Ghana
in a variety of other places appears to be of much higher relevance.
This may reveal a kind of indigenous cosmopolitan orientation (how-
ever paradoxical the term might be) in which an outer world and all
the relations this may imply is considered truly relevant for the cre-
ation of cultural competences such as the performing of proper mar-
riage ceremonies. At the same time this orientation declares both the
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world of Ghanaian cultural practices and the world of Dutch paper
identities as being parochial, partially relevant and negotiable to say
the least. Through the construction of ritual practices like marriages,
but also funerals, and outdooring ceremonies, this connectivity to a
larger world is given shape and meaning. I often noticed that feelings
of empowerment were also restored in the construction of this wider-
ranging legitimacy and morality of, in this case, marriage arrangements.
No longer do the dictates of the family or the nation-state rule absolutely,
holding sway over important aspects of this function, but avenues for
negotiation and therefore for regaining control have been opened. Both
at home and in the diaspora many young people find this very attrac-
tive as it signals another element of modern personhood the religious
ideology of Pentecostalism brings them. It opens, after all, the possi-
bility of being able to define for oneself what it means to be ‘civic’ and
‘civil’ in any situation, despite the fact that in situations of tough iden-
tity politics this may be nothing more than a figment of Pentecostal
imagination.
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NOTES
1. Research took place in the Ghanaian community in The Hague in the years 1997-
2000; in Gaborone research started in 2002. Research in Ghana was made possible by
a grant from the Dutch Organization for the Advancement of Research in the Tropics
(WOTRO).
2. These may concern substances such as the use of certain herbs and concoctions
for the purpose of healing, ritual cleansing through taking baths or the symbolic use of
fire, candles, sacrificial blood and so forth.
3. PNDC is the Provisional National Defense Council, the council formed after the
coup d’état that brought Flight Lieutenant J. Rawlings to power in 1981.
4. Personal communication Dr. B. Agyeman-Duah, Institute of Economic Affairs,
Ghana (October 1998).
5. For Ghanaian women an additional but more complicated trajectory was avail-
able for the arrangement of these marriages that would run via prostitution networks,
a trajectory that I have to omit in the context of this article.
6. A publication in the Heinemann African writers series contains autobiographical
data of a Ghanaian woman who traveled to Europe (Frankfurt, Germany) in search of
her husband, only to find to her surprise that her husband was involved with many
other women working for him as prostitutes and that she was going to be one of them
(A. Darko 1995).
7. In Amsterdam this body is known as RECOGIN, which is comprised of a vari-
ety of ethnic associations, particularly those of Ashanti, the Brong-Ahafo, Fante, Ewe
and Kwahu.
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